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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-000OOO000-
NORVAL R. JONES and 
DELORES S. JONES, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
000OOO000-
Case No. 950751-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)0) of Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
AND CITATION OF RECORD 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ENTERING 
FINDINGS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court erred in entering findings of fact not supported by the 
evidence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, Doelle v. Bradley. 
784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 1995, (1Rec. 103-104); 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, (1Rec. 108-112); Judgment & Decree 
(1Rec. 113, 114); and Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 1994, (1Rec. 149, 
150). 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES ELECTED TO ACCEPT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES, 
TERMINATING THE LEASE AGREEMENT, AND THEREBY 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
The trial court erred in not finding through the course of conduct of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees that Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to accept 
Defendant/Appellant's surrender of the premises, terminating the lease 
agreement, and thereby Plaintiffs/Appellees were not entitled to damages. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
See Point I above. 
CITATION OF RECORD 
See Point I above. 
!AII references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
2 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES FAILED IN THEIR DUTY TO MITIGATE THEIR 
DAMAGES AFTER JULY 1992 BY SEEKING A NEW TENANT. 
The trial court erred in not finding that Plaintiffs/Appellees failed in their 
duty to mitigate their damages by failing to make any effort to find a new tenant 
after July 1, 1992, Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. supra. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The conclusions of law are challenged by Defendant/Appellant. 
Accordingly, the applicable standards of appellate review are for the correctness 
of the conclusions of the trial court and are given no special deference. 
Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
CITATION OF RECORD 
See Point I above. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES TERMINATED THE LEASE AGREEMENT, OR 
ALTERNATIVELY THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES 
WERE IN BREACH OF THEIR DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES, 
The trial court erred in awarding Plaintiffs/Appellees attorney's fees when 
Plaintiffs/Appellees terminated the lease agreement, or alternatively the trial 
court found that Plaintiffs/Appellees were in breach of their duty to mitigate 
damages as required by the lease agreement. 
3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
See Point III above. 
CITATION OF RECORD 
See Point I above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78-36-12.6 Utah Code Annotated: 
(1) "In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises 
and attempt to rent them at the fair rental value, and the tenant who 
abandons the premises shall be liable: 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the 
premises at the fair rental value, plus the difference between the 
fair rental value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the re-renting of the 
premises and costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to 
its condition when rented by the tenant less normal wear and tear 
i) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case: 
The Complaint of Plaintiffs/Appellees' seeks recovery of rental payments 
under the terms of a lease agreement between Plaintiffs/Appellees and 
Defendant/Appellant. Defendant/Appellant asserts the defense that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to terminate the lease agreement and are, therefore, 
not entitled to damages. The trial court found that Plaintiffs/Appellees were 
entitled to rent for the period from July 1,1992, through June 30, 1993, in the 
amount of $19,200 with offset for the use by Plaintiffs/Appellees of the corral, 
4 
hay barn, and the sale of the home, for a total offset of $3,650 and total 
damages of $15,550 for that period of time. Thereafter, from July 1, 1993, to the 
end of the lease term, the trial court found that Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to 
mitigate their damages. The trial court thereby awarded Plaintiffs/Appellees the 
sum of $15,550 in damages and $5,980 attorney's fees and costs. 
B. Course of Proceeding: 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees filed a complaint for rental payments on the 12th 
day of February, 1993. Defendant/Appellant filed his answer on the 26th day of 
March, 1993. The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on the 22nd day 
of February, 1995. 
C. Disposition of the Court below: 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment & Decree on the 20th day of April, 1995. The trial court entered its 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment on the 1st day 
of August, 1995. A Notice of Appeal was filed on the 29th day of August, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs/Appellees and Defendant/Appellant entered into a lease 
agreement on the 21st day of August, 1989, for the lease of certain real property 
as follows (1Rec. 20-22, 248, 284; Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1): 
All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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Lot 1 and 2, Block 14, as platted on Plat "A" of NEWTON TOWNSITE 
SURVEY, and further described as being situated in Sections 18 & 19, 
Township 13, North Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
In accordance with the lease, the leased premises consisted of a milking 
parlor, milking equipment, two (2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging sheds, corrals, 
silo, commodity shed, and tenant house situated on said real property 
(T. 40-41, 44, 79, 100, 255-256; Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1). Said lease agreement 
further provided certain personal property including the following farm 
machinery: 
a. (1) A26 International Tractor with Feed Wagon; 
b. (1) Ford 545 Tractor with Scraper and Loader; 
c. (1)Gehl Grain Chopper; 
d. (1) Ford Tractor and Manure Box; 
e. (1) Knight Manure Spreader. 
(T. 41,92, 256). 
Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement provided for a term of the lease to 
include a period of five (5) years beginning September 1, 1989, and terminating 
at midnight on August 31, 1994 (T. 22, 29; Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1). 
Paragraph 4 of the lease agreement provided as consideration, 
Defendant/Appellant agreed to pay the Plaintiffs/Appellees the sum of $1,600.00 
per month beginning October 1, 1989, and including September 1, 1994 
(T. 87; Plaintiffs'Exhibit #1). 
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Paragraph 8 of the lease agreement provides: 
"Subject only to the conditions provided in paragraph 10 herein, lessee 
shall not leave the leased premises unoccupied or vacated but shall 
continuously, during the entire term of this lease, conduct and carry on 
only that type of a business which on the leased premises is specifically 
set forth in paragraph 3 of the lease agreement." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1). 
Paragraph 17 of the lease agreement provided: 
"The lessee shall be in default of the lease upon the happening of one or 
more of the following events: 
(a) failure to pay any installment of rent or any other sum to be paid by 
lessee hereinunder when due, or within ten (10) days thereafter; 
(b) Upon default of the lessee, lessor may elect to terminate this lease or 
without terminating this lease lessor may take possession of the leased 
premises and relet the same or any part thereof for such term, or terms, 
and at such rental, or rentals, and upon such other terms and conditions 
as lessor, in the exercise of lessor's sole discretion may deem advisable, 
and shall have the right to make alterations and repairs to said leased 
premises. Upon each such reletting, lessee shall be immediately liable 
for, and shall pay to lessor any indebtedness due hereinunder the cost 
and expenses of such reletting, (including advertising costs), brokerage 
fees, reasonable attorney's fees incurred by lessor, the cost of alterations 
and repairs accrued by lessor, and the amount of any rent incurred under 
this lease for the period up to the time of the reletting and thereafter to the 
end of the term of the lease, less the rent actually received from reletting 
the leased premises. If the lessee has been credited with any rent to be 
received by such reletting, and such rents shall not be properly paid to 
lessor by the new lessee, such deficiency shall be calculated and paid 
monthly by lessee. . . ." (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit #1). 
Paragraph 19 of the lease agreement provided: 
"should either of the parties default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein, the defaulting party shall pay the costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fees that may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the leased 
premises, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereinunder, or in the laws 
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of the State of Utah which said remedy is pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1). 
At trial, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that Defendant/Appellant 
left the premises in "approximately September 1991." (T. 88) By moving his dry 
cows and all personal equipment, including a John Deere tractor and truck, 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that he let the premises remain idle, that 
he never thought Defendant/Appellant had left the premises and that he could 
have come back at any time (T. 88-89, 103, 140). Plaintiff/Appellee Norval 
Jones testified that he received rent from Defendant/Appellant through a milk 
assignment until it was completed and has not received any rent from July 1992 
to date. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified when he didn't receive rent from 
Defendant/Appellant in July 1992, he contacted Defendant/Appellant and 
Defendant/Appellant stated that if he had a problem with it to contact his 
attorney (T. 32-34, 104). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after Defendant/Appellant 
vacated the premises, Plaintiffs/Appellees then used the leased estate for their 
own benefit. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified he placed twenty-six (26) 
head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards in October and November 1991, 
placed his hay into the hay sheds in September 1991, placed his own personal 
farm equipment into the commodity sheds, and used the leased farm machinery 
including the grain chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader 
for his own use and benefit (T. 38-41, 97-100). 
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Defendant/Appellant testified that he never authorized Plaintiff/Appellee 
Norval Jones to use the leased facilities including placing hay in the barns and 
Herefords in the corrals (T. 271-272, 274, 276-277). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that in August 1991, he was 
approached by Scott, Defendant/Appellant's ex-employee, who asked 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones if he could continue to occupy the tenant house 
(T. 45-47). Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones also testified that in March 1993, he 
began negotiating a sale of the tenant house (T. 56, 101-102), and on May 3, 
1993, he sold the tenant house to Randy and Karen Jones for $45,000.00 
(T. 100-101, 145). Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones then testified that he sold the 
tenant house because Defendant/Appellant had abandoned the tenant house 
but not the other leased property (T. 102, 145-146). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones also testified that on March 30, 1993, he 
traded in part of the leased equipment including the International Tractor and 
Ford 545 Tractor to Buttars Tractor (T. 105-106). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones received from Defendant/Appellant's 
counsel a letter dated October 8, 1992, which letter stated that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees had interfered with Defendant/Appellant's "right to use, 
enjoyment, and occupation of the family farm . . . . has elected to abandon the 
9 
premises and terminate the lease agreement." (T. 90-91; Defendant's Exhibit 
#21;1Rec. 146). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones further testified that he made no effort to 
release the premises to anyone else and did not relet to any person, or was not 
interested in leasing to them (T. 107-109). Then Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones 
testified that after Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises people wanted to 
rent the house but he "didn't want to fix the house up to be acceptable for 
renters." (T. 101) Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones further testified that three (3) 
different individuals contacted him about reletting the premises immediately after 
Defendant/Appellant left the premises in July 1992, including Goodrich, 
Traveller, and Todd Davis, but Plaintiff didn't want to relet the premises to these 
individuals (T. 107-109). 
Todd Davis testified that he contacted Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones 
about reletting the premises from the Defendant/Appellant immediately after 
Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises (T. 240-243). Plaintiff/Appellee 
Norval Jones testified that he refused to relet the premises to any individual and 
made no effort to relet the premises (T. 107-109). 
At the conclusion of trial, the court determined to further study the issue of 
damages to the premises, as well as to reserve the issue of attorney's fees and 
All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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Plaintiffs/Appellees' Counterclaim against the Defendant/Appellant 
(T. 288-289). 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on the 22nd day of 
February, 1995. In said Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated: 
"The court finds that the Defendant's failure to pay the $1,600.00 monthly 
rental costs is a breach of the lease and commenced in July 1992, 
thereafter, it became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his 
damages. The court finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps 
to mitigate the damages after July 1,1993." (1Rec. 103-104). 
The Trial Court then went on to find damages in the total of $15,550.00 
due on rental after total mitigation offset or the following: 
"Plaintiffs use of corral: $1,400.00; Plaintiffs use of the barn: $2,000.00; 
Plaintiffs sale of the home: $125.00; total mitigation offset: $3,650.00; 
total rent owing from Defendant to Plaintiff after mitigation offset: 
$15,550.00." (1Rec. 103-104). 
In the trial court's second Memorandum Decision on July 5,1995, the 
Plaintiffs/Appellees were awarded attorney's fees due to Defendant's breach of 
the contract. The trial court held that the failure to mitigate was not, in itself, a 
breach of contract, but rather was an occurrence which limited the amount of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees' recovery. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court, in paragraph 9 of its Findings of Fact, made a specific 
finding that Plaintiffs/Appellees had a continuing expectation that 
1
 All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
11 
Defendant/Appellant would return and use the leased premises and for that 
reason failed to relet the premises. Such a finding was clearly erroneous and 
not supported by the clear weight of the evidence. Under Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, it provides: 
"findings of fact, whether based upon oral documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses . . ." 
A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed 
'clearly erroneous' only if we conclude the finding is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. supra. 
II. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Plaintiffs/Appellees had two (2) 
alternative remedies against Defendant/Appellant which they could pursue in 
case of breach of the lease agreement: (1) terminate the lease agreement, or 
(2) take possession of the leased premises and relet the same. The clear weight 
of the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to accept 
Defendant/Appellant's surrender of the premises, terminating the lease 
agreement. Thereby, Plaintiffs/Appellees were not entitled to the damages they 
sought. 
III. The trial court committed error in not finding that Plaintiffs/Appellees 
failed in their duty to mitigate their damages after July 1992 by seeking a new 
tenant. 
12 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
"a landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant liable for unpaid rentals 
has an obligation to commercially make reasonable steps to mitigate its 
losses, which ordinarily means the landlord must seek to relet the 
premises." 
IV. The trial court committed error in awarding Plaintiffs/Appellees attorney's 
fees when Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to terminate the lease agreement. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs/Appellees were not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 
the lease agreement in that Defendant/Appellant successfully defended 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Rule 52(a) provides: 
"findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
This clearly erroneous standard applies where the case is characterized 
as one in equity or in law. Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
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"A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed 
clearly erroneous only if [the court] concludes that the finding is against 
the clear weight of the evidence." In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987); and 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., supra. 
Paragraph 9 of the findings of fact stated Plaintiffs/Appellees: 
"had a continuing expectation that Defendant would return to the leased 
premises." 
However, the clear weight of the testimony shows the contrary. The trial 
court's Memorandum Decision provided: 
"The court finds that Defendant's failure to pay the $1,600 monthly rental 
cost due to breach of the lease commenced in July 1992. Thereafter, it 
became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The court 
finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps to mitigate his 
damages after July 1993." 
The trial court did not state in its Memorandum Decision that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees had an expectation that Defendant/Appellant would return to 
the leased premises. The court stated that after July 1992, it became incumbent 
upon Plaintiffs/Appellees to mitigate their damages. 
The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that after 
Defendant/Appellant abandoned the premises in September 1991, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees did not have an expectation that Defendant/Appellant would 
return: (1) Defendant/Appellant stopped paying rent in July 1992; (2) 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones acknowledged that Defendant/Appellant 
abandoned the premises in September 1991; (3) Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones 
testified that he placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and the feed 
14 
yards in October 1991; (4) Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones placed hay into the 
hay sheds in September 1991, and placed his own personal farm equipment into 
the commodities sheds; (5) Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones used the machinery, 
including the grain chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader 
for his own use and benefit; and (6) Defendant/Appellant's letter dated October 
8,1992, stated that Defendant/Appellant had elected to abandon the premises 
and terminate the lease agreement. 
The weight of the evidence shows that the trial court did not characterize 
its findings in its memorandum decision as one of expectation by 
Plaintiffs/Appellees that Defendant/Appellant would return to the leased 
premises. The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees acknowledged Defendant/Appellant had abandoned the 
premises prior to July 1992 and communicated to Plaintiffs/Appellees that he 
intended not to return. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES ELECTED TO ACCEPT DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES, TERMINATING THE LEASE AGREEMENT, 
AND THEREBY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
In Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Co.. 4 Utah 2d 155, 
289 P.2d 1045 (1955), the Utah Supreme Court made the following statement: 
"The doctrine of election of remedies applies as a bar only where the two 
actions are inconsistent, generally based upon incompatible facts; the 
doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where the two or more remedies 
15 
are given to redress the same wrong and are consistent. Where the 
remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of one that bars the 
other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that operates as 
a bar." ( id at 1049.) 
In Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co.. 69 Utah 161, 253 p. 196 (1927), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It is well settled that one who is induced to make a sale or trade by the 
deceit of a vendee has the choice of two remedies upon his discovery of 
the fraud; he may affirm the contract and sue for his damages, or he may 
rescind it and sue for the property he has sold or what he has paid out on 
the contract. The former remedy counts upon the affirmance or validity of 
the transaction, the latter repudiates the transaction and counts upon its 
invalidity. The two remedies are inconsistent, and the choice of one 
rejects the other, because the sale cannot be valid and void at the same 
time . . . [citation omitted]. . . There thus were open to him at that time two 
coexisting remedies, which were alternative and inconsistent with each 
other, and, when the plaintiff elected the one as he did, the other was no 
longer available. (Id. at 199.) 
The doctrine of an election rests upon the principle that one may not take 
contrary positions, and where he has a right to choose one of two modes 
of redress, and the two are so inconsistent that the assertion of one 
involves a negation or repudiation of the other, the deliberate and settled 
choice of one, with knowledge or means of knowledge of such facts as 
would authorize a resort to each, will preclude him thereafter from going 
back and electing again . . ." (]d at 200.) 
In Royal Resources. Inc. v. Gibralter Financial. Co.. 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and 
its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent 
double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice 
between inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, 
free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a 
purpose to forego all others." (k l at 796.) 
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In Costello v. Kasteler. 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d 772 (1958), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized the principle that a party cannot have a judgment 
against an agent and an undisclosed principal and that the party seeking such 
judgment must elect to hold one or the other. 
In the case at hand, the lease agreement contained the provisions 
governing the Plaintiffs/Appellees' rights in the event of default of the 
Defendant/Appellant. Paragraph 17(b) provided that: 
"Upon default of the lessee, lessor may elect to terminate this lease or 
without terminating this lease lessor may take possession of the leased 
premises and relet the same or any part thereof for such term, or terms, 
and at such rental or rentals, and upon such other terms and conditions 
as lessor, in the exercise of lessor's sole discretion may deem advisable, 
and shall have the right to make alterations and repairs to said leased 
premises. Upon each such reletting, lessee shall be immediately liable 
for, and shall pay to lessor any indebtedness due hereinunder the cost 
and expenses of such reletting, (including advertising costs), brokerage 
fees, reasonable attorney's fees incurred by lessor, the cost of alterations 
and repairs accrued by lessor, and the amount of any rent incurred under 
this lease for the period up to the time of the reletting and thereafter to the 
end of the term of the lease, less the rent actually received from reletting 
the leased premises. If the lessee has been credited with any rent to be 
received by such reletting, and such rents shall not be properly paid to 
lessor by the new lessee, such deficiency shall be calculated and paid 
monthly by lessee. . . ." (Plaintiffs'Exhibit #1). 
As the foregoing provision in the lease clearly indicated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants had two (2) alternative remedies which they could have 
pursued which were mutually exclusive, and the choice of one of which 
precluded the choice of the other as follows: 
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1. Terminate the lease. 
2. Take possession of the leased premises and relet the same, or any 
part thereof, for the term or terms, and at such rental or rentals, and under such 
terms and conditions as may be deemed advisable, and upon such, lessee shall 
be immediately liable for all indebtedness due under the lease agreement, the 
costs and expenses of such reletting, reasonable attorney's fees, the cost of 
alterations and repairs, and the amount of rent incurred under the lease from the 
period up to the time of the reletting. 
3. According to the terms of the lease agreement, the trial court 
should have determined that Plaintiffs/Appellees1 conduct amounted to 
termination of the lease agreement. 
Alternative No. 2 was not available to Plaintiffs/Appellees because 
Plaintiffs/Appellees did not introduce any evidence that they relet the premises, 
or any part thereof, or made alterations or repairs to the leased premises. 
Since the trial court concluded that Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to take 
possession of the leased premises and relet the same under Paragraph 17(b), 
the trial court was obligated to restrict the difference between the contract rate 
and the reletting of the premises, or any part thereof. 
It was reversible error for the trial court to conclude that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to take possession of the leased premises and relet 
the same. Plaintiffs/Appellees acknowledged that they made no effort 
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whatsoever to relet the premises. Therefore, Plaintiffs/Appellees clearly elected 
to terminate the lease agreement in accordance with paragraph 17(a) of the 
lease agreement. The trial court's Judgment must therefore be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES ELECTED TO ACCEPT DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS 
SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES, TERMINATING THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
AND THEREBY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES 
In Willis v. Kronendonk. 58 Utah 592, 200 P. 1025 (1921), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"It has so frequently been held by the courts aforesaid that in case a 
tenant surrenders the premises to his landlord before the end of the term, 
and before any of the rent is due and payable, the tenant is released or 
discharged from the payment of all rent, and that the landlord is without a 
remedy, that the rule has practically become elementary. The doctrine is 
likewise stated by all the text-writers on Landlord and Tenant." (teL at 
1027-1028) 
" . . . the courts are all agreed that, where there is a surrender by a tenant 
and an acceptance by the landlord, as in the case at bar, no action can 
be maintained by the landlord after such surrender for any rent not due 
and payable at or before the surrender went into effect, that in case of 
surrender the landlord can only maintain an action for the rent that was 
due and payable at the time of the surrender, and that in case of 
surrender before the rent is payable there can be no apportionment of the 
rent. So far as the writer is advised there are no decisions to the 
contrary. None have been cited, and the writer, after making diligent 
search, has not found any." (]cL at 1029.) 
"Assuming, however, that there had been merely an abandonment of the 
premises by the defendant, then the result, in view of the undisputed 
facts, would still have to be the same. As pointed out in the case cited 
from California, where a tenant abandons the premises, and the landlord 
unconditionally goes into possession thereof and treats them as though 
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the tenancy had expired, it amounts to a surrender, and the landlord 
cannot thereafter recover any rent, nor sue for damages. If he desires to 
reserve that right, he must recognize the tenant's rights in the premises 
for the unexpired term, and sue him for damages upon his breach of 
covenant to pay rent. This, however, is elementary doctrine." (]d at 
1030.) 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the same ruling in the later case of 
Belanaer v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 272 P.2d 173 (1954). In that case, the Court 
stated: 
"A surrender may take place where there is an express agreement of the 
parties or by operation of law. There is no evidence of an express 
agreement, and hence we must examine those elements which might give 
rise to a surrender by operation of law. As stated in 32 Am. Jur., Landlord 
and Tenant, Sec. 905: 
"A surrender of a lease by operation of law results from acts 
which imply mutual consent independent of the expressed 
intention of the parties that their acts shall have that effect; it 
is by way of estoppel. However, the intention of the landlord 
to accept the tenant's surrender of the premises is important 
on the question of surrender by operation of law, and a 
surrender will not be implied against the intent of the parties, 
as manifested by their act." (]d at 174.) 
"It is fundamental that where a tenant surrenders and the landlord accepts 
the premises during the term of the lease, the landlord cannot recover 
rent not due and payable at the time of the surrender." (]cL at 175.) 
In John C. Cutler Association v. De Jav Stores. 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 P.2d 
700 (1955), the question of whether or not the acts of the parties demonstrated a 
surrender and acceptance of the surrender by the Landlord was reviewed. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
"It is only when he [the landlord] exercises dominion over the premises 
beyond those purposes and inconsistent with the rights of a tenant whom 
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he seeks to hold for the rental of the premises, that a finding of surrender 
is justified." (id at 702.) 
The Court then indicated that there was a conflict of authorities as to "the 
rule of law to be applied in determining whether a reletting will terminate the 
obligations of a lease." After reviewing the three schools of thought on the 
subject, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the following rule: 
"We believe that the third rule referred to by the Connecticut court, 
suggesting that there is no arbitrary standard to be invariably applied, 
best lends itself in doing justice in such controversies, and therefore aline 
ourselves with it. 
The question of surrender, being generally one of fact as to what was the 
intention of the parties, is to be determined from all attendant 
circumstances including the conduct and expressions of the parties." (]d 
at 703.) 
The Supreme Court then indicated that when the lessor leased the 
property to another tenant, and such action constituted an exercise of dominion 
over the property to the exclusion of the tenant, that such act terminated the 
lease agreement as well as any obligation to pay rent thereafter on the lease 
agreement. 
In Frisco Joes. Inc. v. Peav. 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"As a general proposition, where a tenant offers to surrender a lease and 
the landlord agrees to accept the surrender, that extinguishes any liability 
for rent after such surrender. But it does not extinguish rights which have 
accrued beforehand." (Id at 1330.) 
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In Frisco Joes, the Utah Supreme Court modified the judgment of the trial 
court and held that any award for rent accruing after the surrender of the lease 
and acceptance by the landlord "never did become due. It is therefore 
necessary to reduce the judgment by that amount." Qd at 1330.) 
At common law, the critical issue in applying the doctrine of surrender and 
acceptance is to determine whether the landlord intended to accept the 
surrender. This intention may be expressed or implied. See Frisco Joes supra, 
Mariani Air Products Co. v. Gill's Tire Mkt.. 29 Utah 2d 291, 293, 508 P.2d 808, 
810 (Utah 1973); Belanaer v. Rice, supra; and Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., supra. 
In the facts of the case at hand, there is no dispute in the evidence, nor 
any evidence offered, to disprove the following propositions which were clearly 
demonstrated by Defendant/Appellant to show that Plaintiffs/Appellees, by their 
acts, accepted the surrender of the subject premises: 
1. The Defendant/Appellant unequivocally surrendered the premises 
to the Plaintiffs/Appellees as evidenced by abandonment of the premises in 
September 1991; Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay rent in July 1992; notified 
Plaintiffs/Appellees in a letter dated October 8, 1992, of Defendant/Appellant's 
intent to abandon the premises and terminate the lease agreement. 
2. The Plaintiffs/Appellees exercised immediate and absolute 
dominion and control over the premises. 
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3. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after 
Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones 
placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards, placed hay 
into the shed, placed his own personal farm equipment into the commodity 
sheds, and used the farm machinery, including the grain chopper, Ford tractor 
and manure box, and Knight spreader for his own use and benefit. 
4. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones sold the tenant house to Randy and 
Karen Jones. 
5. From and after Defendant/Appellant's surrender of the possession 
of the premises, Defendant/Appellant never attempted to retake possession, 
dominion or control over the premises surrendered. 
6. Plaintiffs/Appellees made no effort whatsoever to relet the 
premises, and Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones acknowledged that he made no 
effort to release the premises to anyone else, and that he didn't want to release 
the premises to anyone else although he was contacted by three (3) parties who 
were interested in leasing the premises immediately after Defendant/Appellant 
vacated the premises. Plaintiffs/Appellees never introduced any evidence to 
demonstrate an election of the remedy, but the evidence demonstrated that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees' conduct, as a matter of law, constituted an election to 
terminate the lease agreement. 
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Since the conduct of Plaintiffs/Appellees clearly amounted to an election 
to terminate the lease agreement, the trial court was obliged to make a specific 
finding on this issue and was compelled, in accordance with the terms of the 
lease agreement and the conduct of the landlord, to conclude an election to 
terminate the lease agreement as a matter of law. 
The findings of the trial court that Plaintiffs/Appellees elected a remedy 
other than by the conduct of termination of the lease agreement is 
unsubstantiated by the assessment of the facts, even those construed most 
favorably to the ruling of the trial court. 
POINT IV 
UNDER REID V. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE CO.. THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT A LANDLORD WHO SEEKS TO HOLD A 
BREACHING TENANT LIABLE FOR UNPAID RENTALS HAS AN OBLIGATION 
TO COMMERCIALLY MAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO MITIGATE ITS 
LOSSES, WHICH ORDINARILY MEANS A LANDLORD MUST SEEK TO 
RELET THE PREMISES. 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on the 22nd day of 
February, 1995. In said Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated: 
"The court finds that Defendant's failure to pay the $1,600 a month rental 
cost is a breach of the lease and commenced in July of 1992. Thereafter, 
it became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The 
court finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps to mitigate the 
damages after July 1, 1993/' 
The court then went on to find damages in the total of $15,000 due on 
rental after total mitigation offset, or the following: Plaintiff's use of the corral -
$1,400; Plaintiff's use of the barn - $2,000; Plaintiff's sale of the home - $125; 
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total mitigation offset - $3,650; total rent owing from the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
after mitigation offset - $15,550. 
The Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law provided: 
"the court finds that the Plaintiffs had a continuing expectation that the 
Defendant would return to and use the leased premises and for this 
reason failed to relet the premises and thereby mitigate their damages. 
The court finds that this expectation on the Plaintiffs' part was reasonable 
but for the period exceeding one year from the date of the initial breach. 
Thereafter, the court finds that it would have been reasonable for the 
Plaintiffs to seek other renters or to find alternative ways to mitigate their 
damages." 
In the case of Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 
906, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"We hold that the landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant liable for 
unpaid rents has an obligation to commercially make reasonable steps to 
mitigate his losses, which ordinarily means a landlord must seek to relet 
the premises." 
Pursuant to 78-36-12.6 Utah Code Annotated, the Utah State Legislature 
has imposed upon a commercial landlord a duty in the case of rental default to 
use its best efforts to relet the premises. It provides: 
(1) "In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises 
and attempt to rent them at the fair rental value, and the tenant who 
abandons the premises shall be liable: 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the 
premises at the fair rental value, plus the difference between the 
fair rental value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the re-renting of the 
premises and costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to 
its condition when rented by the tenant less normal wear and tear 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Olympus Hills Shopping Center Ltd. v. 
Landes, 821 P.2d 451 (Utah 1991), held that it is a landlord's duty to mitigate 
damages to use "best efforts" to relet the premises. 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
defined the duty imposed upon the landlord. It provided: 
"the landlord . . . has the burden of proving both the amount of damages 
and the fact that it took appropriate mitigation efforts. Assume the 
landlord carries this burden, a judgment and damage award on the whole 
cause arising out of the breach can therefore be rendered. . ." (teL at 
906). 
"Another point warranting clarification is the affirmative nature of the 
mitigation. Some courts impose a mitigation requirement due not 
requiring landlords to show active efforts to relet; instead, the landlord 
can carry its proof of mitigation burden simply by showing that it was 
passively receptive to opportunities to relet the premises [citations 
omitted]. We conclude that this minimal showing does not show the 
policies that underlie the adoption of the mitigation requirements. We 
prefer to follow these courts that have required that a landlord take 
positive steps reasonably calculated to effect a reletting of the premises." 
(Id at 906). 
"Only by following such a course can we insure that serious efforts are 
made to redeploy the rental property in a productive fashion by those who 
are best able to accomplish that, and who are also best able to prove that 
the required mitigation efforts have been carried out." (jdL at 906). 
"A further word about the standard by which the landlord's efforts to 
mitigate are measured: the standard is one of objective commercial 
reasonableness [citation omitted]. A landlord is obligated to take such 
steps as would be expected of a reasonable landlord lending out the 
similar property in the same market conditions." (]d at 906-907). 
The trial court found that Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay $1,600 
monthly rental was a breach of the lease and commenced in July 1992. 
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Thereafter, the trial court then found it incumbent upon the Plaintiffs/Appellees to 
mitigate their damages. In conflict of the Memorandum Decision, the Findings of 
Fact & Conclusions of Law provided that Plaintiffs/Appellees had a continuing 
expectation that the Defendant/Appellant would return and use the premises, 
and for that reason failed to relet the premises and thereby mitigated their 
damages. The trial court found that the Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to take 
adequate steps to mitigate damages after July 1, 1993. 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after Defendant/Appellant 
vacated the premises, people wanted to rent the house, which was part of the 
leased premises, but he didn't want to fix the house up to make it acceptable for 
renters. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones further testified that three (3) different 
individuals contacted him about releasing the premises after 
Defendant/Appellant abandoned the premises, including Goodrich in September 
1992, and Todd Davis in October/November 1992. But, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval 
Jones didn't want to relet the premises to those individuals. Plaintiff/Appellee 
Norval Jones further testified that he made no effort to release the premises to 
anyone else and did not release the premises to any person, or was not 
interested in leasing to them. Todd Davis testified that he contacted 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones about releasing the premises from 
Plaintiff/Appellee immediately after Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises. 
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However, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that he refused to relet the 
premises to any individual and made no effort to relet the premises. 
It was reversible error, from clear weight of the evidence, for the trial court 
to conclude that Plaintiffs/Appellees' didn't have a duty to mitigate damages after 
Defendant/Appellant abandoned the leased premises after September 1991, and 
breached the lease for failure to pay rent in July 1992. It was error for the trial 
court to award one (1) additional year of rental from July 1992 to July 1993. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Under the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, upon default the 
lessor could: 
"Elect to terminate this lease agreement, or without terminating the lease 
agreement, take possession of the leased premises and relet the same or 
any part thereof." 
A. THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS TERMINATED, AND, 
THEREFORE, NEITHER PARTY IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Under paragraph 17(b) of the lease agreement it provides: 
"Upon default of the lessee, lessor may elect to terminate this lease or 
without terminating this lease lessor may take possession of the leased 
premises and relet the same or any part thereof for such term, or terms, 
and at such rental, or rentals, and upon such other terms and conditions 
as lessor, in the exercise of lessor's sole discretion may deem advisable, 
and shall have the right to make alterations and repairs to said leased 
premises. Upon each such reletting, lessee shall be immediately liable 
for, and shall pay to lessor any indebtedness due hereinunder the cost 
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and expenses of such reletting, (including advertising costs), brokerage 
fees, reasonable attorney's fees incurred by lessor, the cost of alterations 
and repairs accrued by lessor, and the amount of any rent incurred under 
this lease for the period up to the time of the reletting and thereafter to the 
end of the term of the lease, less the rent actually received from reletting 
the leased premises. If the lessee has been credited with any rent to be 
received by such reletting, and such rents shall not be properly paid to 
lessor by the new lessee, such deficiency shall be calculated and paid 
monthly by lessee. . . ." (Plaintiffs'Exhibit #1). 
Since Plaintiffs/Appellees, through their course of conduct, terminated the 
lease agreement, neither party is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the lease 
agreement because the lease agreement was terminated. 
B. PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THAT DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES' 
CLAIM FOR RENTAL BASED UPON 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES' FAILURE TO MITIGATE 
DAMAGES. 
Defendant/Appellant successfully defended Plaintiffs/Appellees' claim for 
rental for the entire length of the lease term. The court only awarded the 
Plaintiffs/Appellees one (1) year's rental because Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones 
breached his duty to mitigate his damages. The trial court additionally only 
awarded partial damages to the premises. 
Plaintiffs/Appellees were in breach of the lease agreement by violating 
Utah law in failure to mitigate their damages. Plaintiffs/Appellees did not elect to 
terminate the lease agreement and elected not to take possession of the leased 
premises. In accordance with paragraph 19 of the lease agreement: 
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"should either of the parties default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein, the defaulting parties shall pay the costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fees that may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the leased 
premises, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereinunder or in the laws 
of the State of Utah which said remedy is pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise." 
Clearly, through the trial court's own Memorandum Decision, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees have violated the lease agreement by not electing to relet 
the premises and failure to mitigate damages all in violation of the lease 
agreement and violation of Utah law. To award Plaintiffs/Appellees all of their 
attorney's fees is contrary to the lease agreement and in violation of Utah law 
and Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. supra. 
It was reversible error to award Plaintiffs/Appellees their attorney's fees 
when the lease was terminated. Alternatively, it was error to provide 
Plaintiffs/Appellees their attorney's fees when Plaintiffs/Appellees clearly failed 
to mitigate their damages in violation of paragraph 19 of said lease agreement. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed error by allowing findings of fact not supported 
by the evidence, particularly, that for the first year that Plaintiffs/Appellees had a 
reasonable expectation that Defendant/Appellant would return to the leased 
premises. 
The trial court committed further error by not finding that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to accept Defendant/Appellant's surrender, thereby 
30 
terminating the lease agreement and preventing Plaintiffs/Appellees from claims 
of damages. 
Alternatively, the trial court committed error by concluding that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees did not have a duty to find a new tenant until after July 1, 
1993. 
Finally, the trial court committed error in awarding Plaintiffs/Appellees 
their attorney's fees providing that this court determines that Plaintiffs/Appellees 
elected to terminate the lease agreement. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs/Appellees are not entitled to attorney's fees in that 
Defendant/Appellant successfully defended Plaintiffs/Appellees' claim for rental 
based upon their failure to mitigate damages. 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and either: (1) the case 
should be remanded with instructions; or (2) the judgment award 
Plaintiffs/Appellees should be reduced to the amount of property damages to the 
premises in the sum of $5,980; (3) alternatively, find that Plaintiffs/Appellees had 
elected to terminate the lease agreement; (4) neither party should be awarded 
attorney's fees. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION - DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1995 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGMENT & DECREE 
SECOND MEMORANDUM DECISION - DATED JULY 5, 1995 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
-DATED APRIL 21, 1995 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORVAL R. JONES and 
DELORES S. JONES 
PLAINTIFFS, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 930000077 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter was tried to the Court oil July 7, 1994. At the conclusion of the trial the 
Court announced partial findings and decision and directed Counsel to conduct further 
research and submit written memoranda of points and authorities. Plaintiffs Memorandum 
was submitted October 18, 1994. Defendant's Memorandum toa§ Submitted January 3, 1995. 
Both memoranda were substantially beyond the deadlines set by thfc Court. The Court will 
accept both memoranda and has reviewed the same, but notes that the passage of time 
compounds the difficulty in making a precise calculation concerning the issues. 
As previously indicated, the Court finds that the August 2i* 1989 Lease is valid and 
enforceable and was never modified by the parties. The Court further finds that paragraph 
17 of the Lease empowers the Plaintiff to relet the premises if the Defendant is in default. 
Plaintiff testified he referred several inquiries concerning the property to the Defendant. 
Defendant testified that in November 1991, Plaintiff stated that because of difficulties and 
damages, he would "never relet the place again." The Court finds that Defendant's failure to 
pay the $1600.00 monthly rental constituted a breach of the Lease and commenced in July 
1992. Thereafter, it became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps to mitigate damages after July 1, 
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1993. The Court will allow the rent to accrue for the one year period for the initial breach 
and finds that such a period of time would have been reasonable for the Plaintiff to seek 
other renters or find alternate ways of mitigating damages. Therefore, the Court finds that 
rent is due and owing for the period of July 1, 1992 through June 30, 1993 in the amount of 
$19,200.00. 
During the period of July 1992 through June 30, 1993, the Plaintiff did take certain 
measures to mitigate damages and these shall be allowed as offsets as follows: 
Plaintiff's use of the coral 
Plaintiff's use of hay barn 
Plaintiff's sale of home 
in May 1993 





Total rent owing from Defendant $15,550.00 
to Plaintiff after mitigation offset 
The Court has reviewed the property damage claims of Plaintiff including the 
exhibits. During the term of the Lease, the facilities were already father old and equipment 
"well worn". On the other hand, the exhibits leave little doubt that significant damage 
occurred during the period of Defendant's occupancy. Many of th£ damages claimed by 
Plaintiff would leave the Plaintiff with new equipment, whereas, the equipment at the 
commencement of the Lease was far from new. 
After reviewing the exhibits and evidence, the Court awards property damages in 




The Defendant having breached the Lease, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys 
fees incurred herein. Judgment is awarded against Defendants in the amount of $5,305.23 
for attorneys fees, and costs, together with such reasonable fees and costs as are hereafter 
documented from the date of trial until the Judgment is ultimately satisfied. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare comprehensive Findings and 
Conclusions as well as a Judgment in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this 2^ day of February, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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o the following: 
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Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 




MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 930000077 CV 
This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00 
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice, 
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their 
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan. The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary 
evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the 
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the 
Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
1. 
FINDINGS OF FACTt 
Under date of July 21, 1989 the Plaintiffs as Lessor1 
entered into a written Lease witfy'the Defendant as Lessee covering! 
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premises consisting of land, a milking parlor, milking equipment, 
two (2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging sheds, corrals, a silo, a 
commodity shed, a tenant house and various items of farm machinery 
and equipment. Said property will be referred to hereinafter as 
the Leased Premises. 
2. The term of the Lease was for five (5) years beginning 
September l, 1989 mnd. terminating at midnight on August 31, 1994. 
3. By the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to pay 
Plaintiff monthly rental of $1,600.00 each month beginning October 
1, 1989 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter 
through and including September 1, 1994. 
4. Under the terms of the Lease, on any payment which was due 
which was not made on the due date or within five (5) days 
thereafter, Lessee agreed to pay a late charge of five percent (5%) 
of the unpaid amount of such installment. 
5. Under the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to care 
for and maintain the improvements constituting part of the Leased 
Premises and all equipment constituting a part of the Leased 
Premises in their condition as at the beginning of the Lease, 
reasonable wear and tear accepted. Defendant further covenanted 
under the terms of the Lease to promptly repair in a workmanlike 
manner all damage to improvements and all equipment constituting a 
part of the Lease Premises at Defendant's sole cost and expense. 
6. The Court finds that the Lease is valid and enforceable 
and was never terminated or. modified by the parties either 
specifically or by a course of dealing between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant. 
7. The Defendant defaulted in the Lease by, among other 
things, failing to pay monthly rental payments thereon after July 
1, 1992 and by failure to keep the improvements on the Leased 
Premises in good order and by failure to care for and maintain the 
improvements on the premises and by abandoning the Leased Premises 
at or about the time Defendant ceased paying rental payments on the 
Lease. 
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8. The Plaintiffs, with the express consent of Defendant, 
used one (1) of the corrals and the hay barn on the Leased Premise 
subsequent to Defendant's vacating the same and sold the tenant 
house. The reasonable rental for the corral used by the Plaintiffs 
was $1,400.00, the reasonable value of the use of the hay barn by 
the Plaintiffs was $2,000.00 and interest earned by Plaintiffs on 
the proeeadfl from th« «ieil« of th© tenant house from thu time w o H 
to the termination of the Lease is $225.00, making a total offset 
to which Defendant would be entitled for sums owing by Defendant to 
Plaintiffs under the Lease is $3,650.00. 
9. The Court finds that Plaintiffs had a continuing 
expectation that Defendant would return to and use the Leased 
Premises and for this reason failed to relet the premises and 
thereby mitigate their damages. The Court finds that this 
expectation on the Plaintiffs' part was reasonable but not for a 
period exceeding one (1) year from the date of the initial breach. 
Thereafter, the Court finds that it would have been reasonable for 
Plaintiffs to seek other renters or to find alternate ways of 
mitigating their damages. 
10. Based upon the foregoing findings of the Court, the Court 
determines that the rentals due under the Lease for a period of one 
(1) year after Defendant stopped making rental payments is the sum 
of $19,200.00 plus interest at ten percent (10%) from the date due 
until paid and late charges. Interest accrued to April 1, 1995 
totals $4,239.94 and late charges total $960.00. 
11. The Court finds that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claim 
that the damages to the Leased Premises caused by or as a result of 
the Defendant's unreasonable use of the same totaled $8,263.00, the 
actual sum of the claims were for replacement costs of old 
equipment and that under the circumstances* reasonable compensation 
for improvements damaged by the Defendant on the Leased Premises is 
$5,980.00 plus interest thereon from July 1, 1992 at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum Interest accrued to April 1, 1995 is 
$1,644.49. 
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12 . The Court finds that the Lease provides for the recovery 
of attorney's fees in the event of a default. The Court further 
finds that the Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action 
and determines that a reasonable attorney's fee for the period 
through the trial of this case is $5,305.23. 
13. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
their eaomtm upon filing an appropriate cost bond and, further, are 
entitled reasonable fees and costs hereafter incurred and 
documented until ultimate satisfaction of this Court's judgment. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CPMCfrVftlOWl QP ****** 
1. That Judgment should enter in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the amount of 
$19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to April 1, 
1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 less 
mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn and 
for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease 
payments, interest and late charges of $20,74 9.94. 
2. Judgment should enter against Defendant for damages to the 
Leased Premises in the amount of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to 
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $1,644.49. 
3. Judgment should be in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of 
this case plus their costs and that judgment should provide that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment for such further costs and 
attorney's fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of 
Trial and until said Judgment is satisfied. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
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DATED this /V day of April, 1995. 
mmn If. HueaeittiJI 
District Court/ Judg 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Defendant's Attorney, 
Gregory Skabelund, at 2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage 
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1995. 
/T^U4& Wtt*"** 
L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/jones.fof 
N-4213 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TflfS FIRST aUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 




MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Case No. 930000077 CV 
This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00 
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice, 
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their 
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan. The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary 
evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the 
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the 
Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
hi» won1 MM) 
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1. That Judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the 
amount of $19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to 
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 
less mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn 
and for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease 
pnymenfcp, interest and late charges of $20,749.94, 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant for damages to the Leased Premises in the amount 
of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to April 1, 1995 in the amount 
of $1,644.49. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of 
this case plus their costs plus such further costs and s*fcfcarne»y'n 
fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of Trial and 
until said Judgment is satisfied. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this \L\ day of April, 1995 
-T^W/I.,/1 
Ben H. Hadfield 
District Court J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Decree, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, at 
2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, 
this 29th day of March, 1995 
/f^^y^ 
L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/jones jud 
N-4213 
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ti. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 




MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Case No. 930000077 CV 
This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00 
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the courtroom in the Hall of Justice, 
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their 
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan. The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary 
evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the 
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the 
Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
II h 
1. That Judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the 
amount of $19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to 
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 
less mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn 
and for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease 
pi*ym»nfcia, inherit and lata ahmxgam of $20,74 9,94. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant for damages to the Leased Premises in the amount 
of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to April 1, 1995 in the amount 
of $1,644.49. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of 
this case plus their costs plus such further costs and attorney's 
fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of Trial and 
until said Judgment is satisfied. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED t h i is.ii day of April, 1995 
/£/ B:^ 3 H. HAHHEIE 
Ben H. Hadfield 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Decree, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, at 
2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, 




IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORVAL R. JONES and 
DELORES S. JONES 
PLAINTIFFS, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 930000077 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Alter Or 
Amend Judgment. The Court has reviewed the Motion, accompanying memorandum, 
Plaintiff's reply memorandum and Defendant's response. 
Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages and therefore 
should be awarded no damages. Defendant's argument seems to totally overlook the 
consequences of Defendant's undisputed breach. A duty to mitigate only arises if a breach 
occurs. In the typical occurrence, a lessee defaults in rent, a lessor makes efforts to obtain 
an alternate lessee, and within a reasonable period of time, that alternate lessee is making the 
rental payments or a portion thereof, thereby mitigating the damages. The Court held in this 
case, that reasonable mitigation efforts by Plaintiffs should have produced an alternate lessee 
within ov\c yea* from ihc breach. The breach occurred IxAy 1, 1992 v^teri Defendant fatted 
to pay the rent owing. 
The Court stands by its original decision concerning the mitigation issue. The 
Judgment as prepared and entered was, in the Court's view, the correct amount. 
\V >' I r t| i M r „ , 
Memorandum Decision 
Civil No. 930000077 
Page 2 
Defendant's second point of alleged error claims it was improper to award "post-
judgment interest". The argument following this assertion addresses the issue of "pre-
judgment interest". Presumably, Defendant's argument is directed to the issue of pre-
judgment interest. UCA 15-1-1 (2) provides an interest rate of 10% in circumstances such as 
the present. Plaintiff was entitled to Interest at this rate from the date eacli amount became 
due and certain. The general prayer for relief in the Complaint is sufficient to cover the 
issue of statutory interest. 
The third error alleged by Defendant is that Plaintiffs were hot entitled to recover 
their attorneys fees because Plaintiffs had failed to mitigate damages. This argument 
confuses two separate and distinct issues. The Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees due to 
the Defendant's breach of the Contract. The Plaintiffs failure to mitigate was not, in itself, a 
breach of the Contract, but rather was an occurrence which limited the amount of Plaintiffs' 
recovery. The award of attorneys fees and costs Is affirmed. 
Defendants' Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment is denied in its entirety. Counsel 
for Plaintiffs is directed to prepare an Order in conformance herewith. 
J j y 
DATED this i T day of4unb, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 6th day of July , 199 5, 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Brent Hoggatt Gregory Skabelund 
Olson and Hoggan 2176 North Main 
88 West Center Street Logan, UT 84321 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 




MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930000077 CV 
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In this matter the Court made and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree on April 14, 1995. On 
April 24, 1995 the Defendant made a Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment of the Court entered on April 14, 1995 and, in support of 
said Motion filed a Memorandum to which counsel for the Plaintiff 
made a reply and Defendant made response. On the same date as his 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Defendant requested a hearing 
on his Motion. The matter having been fully briefed to the Court, 
the Court having read and considered the Memoranda of the parties 
and being fully advised in the premises and having on July 5, 1995 
entered a Memorandum Decision in writing and the Court having found 
and hereby does find that the issues raised by Defendant in his 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment are framed and argued in the 
Memoranda of the parties and the disposition of Defendant's Motion 
will not dispose of the issues in the case on the merits with 
prejudice, 
f » 
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NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as 
follows: 
1. That Defendant's request for a hearing on his Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment be and the same is hereby denied. 
2 . For the reasons and on the grounds stated by the Court in 
its Memorandum Decision of July 5, 1995, Defendant's Motion to 
A U i r PIT ^vn^^j^i^if^^Qjfy^!1^^ hereby denied. 
DATEI 1995 
Ben H. Hadfield 7] 
District Court Judge 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment to Defendant's 
Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, at 2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 
84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 19th day of July, 1995. 
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Gregory Skabelund #5346 ' o?'o> 
Attorney at Law %• ' v ^ 
2176 North Main fy 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORVALR JONES and 
DELORES S JONES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
MICHAEL J ARAMBEL, Civil No. 936000169 
Defendant/Appellant. Judge Ben H Hadfield 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Appellant, Michael J. Arambel, by and 
through his counsel, Gregory Skabelund, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final 
order of the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield entered in this matter on August 1, 1995. The 
appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this ^7 day of August, 1995. 
GREGORY SkABELUND 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
q 3^)77 
iSl 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
DATED this 'Xf day of August, 1995. 
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